Emotion cycles – Page 1 Emotion cycles: On the social influence of emotion in organizations 1 by Shlomo Hareli & Anat Rafaeli
Emotion cycles – Page 1 
 
 
Emotion cycles: On the social influence of emotion in organizations
1 
 
Shlomo Hareli   
University of Haifa 
Haifa  
Israel 
shareli@gsb.haifa.ac.il  
 
Anat Rafaeli  
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology 
Haifa 
Israel 
anatr@ie.technion.ac.il 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in Research in Organizational Behavior 
 
May 2007 
 
                                                  
1 The authors contributed equally to this paper. We would like to thank the editors for their insightful 
comments on earlier versions of this chapter and our respective research teams for the stimulating emotion 
cycles that they create for us. Emotion cycles – Page 2 
 
Abstract 
Human emotion is typically studied as a within-person, one-direction, non-repetitive 
phenomenon; focus has traditionally been on how one individual feels in reaction to various 
stimuli at a certain point in time. But people recognize and inevitably react emotionally and 
otherwise to expressions of emotion of other people. We propose that organizational dyads 
and groups inhabit emotion cycles: Emotions of an individual influence the emotions, 
thoughts and behaviors of others; others' reactions can then influence their future 
interactions with the individual expressing the original emotion, as well as that individual's 
future emotions and behaviors. People can mimic the emotions of others, thereby extending 
the social presence of a specific emotion, but can also respond to others' emotions, 
extending the range of emotions present. People can also draw attributions and extract 
meanings from others' emotions. Emotion cycles can involve both intended targets of or 
partners to an original emotion and third parties who were not the intended targets or 
partners. Emotion cycles are sensitive to various moderating factors, including 
demographic variables (e.g., gender or race) and situational variables (e.g., relative power 
of participants). Pertinent organizational and psychological research that supports the idea 
of emotion cycles is reviewed and shown to suggest a wide arena for future research.  Emotion cycles – Page 3 
They may forget what you said.  
They will never forget how you made them feel. 
 
Imagine yourself at a faculty meeting in which a decision concerning the 
appointment of a new faculty member is discussed. You don't have a strong opinion 
concerning the prospective candidate because the open job is not in your field of expertise, 
but as the department head explains why she thinks this candidate should be appointed, one 
of your colleagues belligerently accuses her of trying to impose her opinion. The 
department head responds in kind, and an escalatory cycle of angry exchanges evolves. 
Others present at the meeting try to calm things down, but you feel embarrassed. Eventually 
the department head apologizes, but your angry colleague fails to acknowledge the apology, 
and the discussion continues in an unpleasant atmosphere until decisions are made and the 
meeting ends. The department head and your colleague do not talk to each other from that 
point on, and the atmosphere in the department becomes tense. Other people who were not 
present at the meeting but heard about it also come to develop an anxiety about future 
meetings. 
All of us have experienced situations where expressions of emotion by one 
individual shape the emotions, thoughts and behaviors of others. Yet these situations are 
poorly captured by prevailing research on emotion, which has generally maintained a 
within-person view, focusing primarily on the antecedents and consequences of an 
individual's own affective reactions. For example, the underlying logic of the "affective 
events theory" (AET) suggested in this series by Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) is that 
emotions experienced by an individual while performing a particular task influence the later 
emotions and task performance of the same individual. Empirical research has offered 
support for this theory (e.g., Beal, Trougakos, Weiss & Green, 2006; Fisher, 2000), and has 
led to follow-up research on the impact of affect on different within-person phenomena 
such as motivation, creativity, or decision making (cf. Forgas & George, 2001).  Emotion cycles – Page 4 
Our goal in this chapter is to contribute to the "affective revolution" of 
organizational behavior (Barsade, Brief & Spataro, 2003) by considering the reciprocal 
interpersonal influence of emotions – an idea originally mentioned, albeit briefly, by 
Rafaeli & Sutton (1989) in this series but which has not received much attention. We 
propose that one person's emotion is a factor that can shape the behaviors, thoughts and 
emotions of other people, and that emotion operates in cycles that can involve multiple 
people in a process of reciprocal influence. Our analysis presumes that the emotions of an 
agent are manifested through facial, vocal, postural or verbal behavior, and so can be 
perceived by (and therefore can affect) others (Ekman, 1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 
Fridlund, 1994; Frijda, 1997; Izard, 1971; Keltner, Ekman, Gonzaga & Beer, 2003; Rimé, 
Mesquita, Philippot & Boca, 1991; Scherer, 1986)
2. We also presume that people react to 
and draw inferences from an agent's emotions (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1995; 
Clark, Pataki & Carver, 1996; Cote, 2005; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989), and that 
emotions may affect not only the person at whom the emotion was directed (e.g., the 
department head in our story above), but also third parties who observe an agent's emotion 
(e.g., you, as a relatively uninvolved participant in the meeting). Moreover, emotions can 
affect larger social entities such as a group or a team (Barsade, 2000; De Dreu, West, 
Fischer & MacCurtain, 2001; Felps, Mitchell, & Byington, 2006; Tiedens, Sutton & Fong, 
2004), and can ignite a cycle of emotion interchanges and other effects between an emotive 
agent and multiple parties (Smith & Conrey, 2007).   
That manifestations of emotion can influence others is not a completely new idea. 
The premise of research on emotional labor is that emotions displayed by individuals as 
part of their work role are intended to influence others (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; 
Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989). However, this line of work has focused primarily on 
                                                  
2 For the sake of clarity, throughout the chapter we use the term agent to refer to the person emitting an 
original emotion; we use the term other to refer to a person who observes, interprets and is influenced by the 
emotion. As will become clear in our analysis, during the process of an emotion cycle, agent and other trade 
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displays of emotion intended to promote organizational goals, such as customer satisfaction 
and sales (Pugh, 2001; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) and has drifted toward a focus on within-
person psychological processes such as surface or deep acting (Ashforth & Humphrey, 
1993, 1995; Grandey, 2003). 
A range of relatively recent studies in specific thematic areas have also noted that 
affect displayed by a given individual influences others. Glaser and Salovey (1998), for 
example, discussed the impact of a political candidate's emotions on voters while LaFrance 
and Hecht (1995) looked at the way smiles of people accused of a transgression determine 
how they are judged by others. These studies begin to meet the need noted by Manstead 
(1991), and echoed by Stroud, Glaser and Salovey (2005), for unraveling the ways in which 
emotions of one person affect others. Likewise, these studies respond to the emergent view 
in both psychology and sociology of the social nature of emotions (cf. Barbelet, 1996; 
Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987; Parkinson, 1996; Parkinson, Fischer & Manstead, 2005; Planalp, 
1999). But the view of emotions as social entities has received limited attention in 
organizational behavior. A first goal of the current chapter is, therefore, to review available 
research supporting this view.  
Accruing evidence concerning the social influence of emotions in organizational 
contexts also currently lives in conceptual isolation: missing is an overarching theoretical 
framework to guide additional research. Our second goal is to advance a conceptual 
structure that summarizes available theory and findings, and offers inspiration for 
additional research on cyclical emotion dynamics in organizations. Our analysis will reveal 
that most available research has maintained a uni-directional view, examining the effects of 
one agent's emotions on observers. Our theoretical analysis, which suggests a cyclical 
process involving multiple iterations between multiple people, is consistent with the call for Emotion cycles – Page 6 
a more general recognition of the repetitive or cyclical nature of social interactions (e.g., 
Smith & Conrey, 2007).  
The double-interact social process implied by our model suggests that organizations 
are characterized by "emotion cycles," in addition to more familiar cognitive and behavioral 
cycles that others have described (cf. Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Cote, 2005). The 
igniting forces in the "emotion cycles" we discuss are one agent's emotions. Others' 
reactions may be emotions as well, but elements of the cycle can also include cognitions, 
attributions and behaviors (cf. Tiedens, 2000b), similar perhaps to the trust cycle described 
in this series by Weber, Malhotra and Murnigham (2005). In addition, although most 
previous research has focused on individuals (i.e., agents or observers) as units of analysis, 
our analysis suggests effects of manifested emotions on other social entities that can be 
involved in emotion cycles, such as dyads or groups (Smith & Conrey, 2007).  
Because emotion can be reliably observed at the group level (Bartel & Saavedra, 
2000) and can be a source of information about group dynamics (Magee & Tiedens, 2006), 
we extrapolate to theorize that emotions of individual group members can influence the 
affect, cognition and performance of groups. Here as well some theoretical assertions have 
appeared (De Dreu et al., 2001; Felps et al., 2006; Kelly & Barsade, 2001), and scattered 
empirical studies have documented effects of both positive (Barsade, 2000, 2002; Sy, Cote 
& Saavedra, 2005) and negative affect (Rafaeli, Cheshin & Israeli, 2007). Our goal is to 
provide an overarching theory that can integrate such findings and stimulate future 
research, while also recognizing and emphasizing the cyclical nature of the effects.  
Our chapter extends recent discussions in the organizational literature, including the 
review in this series by Morris and Keltner (2000) and the discussion by Felps et al (2006) 
on the important functions that emotion serves in social interactions. We extend Morris and 
Keltner's (2000) focus on the function of specific emotions in the context of negotiation and 
Felps's et al (2006) discussion in the context of a problematic work team member to Emotion cycles – Page 7 
consider any social interaction in organizations and the ongoing cyclical nature of emotion 
effects. We also consider the role of moderating factors in shaping the social influence of 
emotions to show, for example, how specific emotions may serve different social functions 
in different situations. Individuals' emotions emerge from our analysis as inputs that – 
similar to other phenomena – evoke a process of sense making (Weick, 1995): members of 
an organization make sense of and interpret the emotions of other people which influences 
their own emotions and behaviors as well as the processes and outcomes of the involved 
organizational dyads, groups or teams. Individual emotions also emerge as triggers of a 
cycle that may feed back to an emotive individual.  
As a point of departure, our review of available research suggests that agents' 
emotions can have effects on four broad sets of factors. The first three are (a) emotions of 
other persons, (b) inferences of other persons, and (c) behaviors of other persons; these 
influences then can be precursors of (d) interactions and relationships between the agent 
and other persons. We suggest, in other words, that people are likely to react emotionally 
when exposed to agents' emotions, but also that agents' emotions can influence the 
inferences and behaviors of other persons as well as ensuing interactions between the agent 
and others. Some if not all of these reactions are likely to feed back to the agent, which may 
solidify or modify the agents' emotion, and re-ignite the social influence process that our 
theory depicts, as graphically illustrated in Figure 1. For example, the anger of an agent 
may elicit disdain in an observer, making the observer behave in an aloof manner toward 
the agent; seeing this, the agent may tone down the anger and become friendlier, which may 
in turn reduce the disdain of the observer and improve the relationship between the two.
3   
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about Here 
                                                  
3  Our analysis is only of emotions that can be perceived by others, not emotions which are not outwardly 
manifested through, e.g., body language or verbal expression. For brevity's sake, our use of the term 'emotion' 
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____________________________________ 
Below, we first review three initial ways that an agent's emotions can influence 
others. As our analysis unfolds it will become apparent that the social influence of emotion 
can vary in terms of the emotions evoked in others (similar emotions, different emotions 
that complement agent emotions or different emotions that respond to inferences drawn 
from agent emotion or agent situation). The social influence process can also vary in the 
dynamics entailed: it may entail mimicking of an agent's emotions, emotion interpretation 
and emotional reaction to agent emotion, and drawing inferences from an agent's emotion. 
We then review the effects of these initial influences on intra-and inter-personal outcomes 
involving the agent and the other person and identify factors that can moderate the pattern 
of an emotion cycle. In closing, we suggest theoretical implications and research directions 
inspired by our analysis.  
Emotion as a Driver of Social Influence  
Emotions are intra-psychic experiences (Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1998; Frijda, 
1988), but they can at the same time be subject to observation by other people (e.g., Ekman, 
1992, 1993; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003: Fridlund, 1991; Rimé, Finkenauer, Luminet, Zech 
& Philippot, 1998; Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot & Boca, 1991) – in which case they can 
serve as social signals (Barrett & Nelson-Goens, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000) and can 
provoke various interpersonal processes (Cote, 2005; Elfenbein, Maw-Der, White, Hwee-
Hoon, & Aik, 2006; Parkinson et al., 2005). For example, sadness is likely to elicit empathy 
and social support, while embarrassment is likely to deflect the attention of others away 
from an agent (Keltner & Buswell, 1997).  
Observers are highly sensitive to agents' emotions, and are capable of recognizing 
the messages these emotions convey with relatively little effort (Calder, Young, Perrott, 
Etcoff & Roland, 1996; O'Rorke & Ortony, 1994). Note that while the emotion an agent Emotion cycles – Page 9 
displays may not be an authentic reflection of his or her actual state (although the 
authenticity of displayed emotions is sometimes decipherable by others; see Ekman, 1992; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Frank, Ekman & Friesen, 1993), the social influence process we 
discuss is driven by presumed or attributed emotions of the agent, regardless of whether 
these are genuine or not.
4 The impact of the perceived genuineness of these emotions will 
be discussed later as one factor that may moderate some of the effects we describe.  
The influence of an agents' emotion may be direct – i.e., on the individual who is 
the object or the cause of the emotion (the target of or partner to the agent emotion), but 
also indirect – on other people who observe or are made aware of an agent's emotion. For 
example, anger displayed by an agent may have a direct effect on the target of the anger, 
but may also have an indirect effect – whether intentional or inadvertent – on bystanders or 
third-party observers. The third-party effect is similar to the "footings" process described by 
Goffman (1981:124) about human communication, in which elements of speech reach both 
a ratified audience (those being addressed or with license to overhear) and non-ratified 
listeners (eavesdroppers). In our analysis, therefore, human emotion becomes a form of 
interpersonal communication that can reach and influence multiple audiences, be they 
direct targets of the emotion, witnesses to it, or even people who learn about the emotion 
third-hand. Similar to other forms of communication, the effects of emotion are not uni-
directional: People (agents) are likely to pick up and respond to the reactions of others, 
which may lead to changes in originally felt or displayed emotion, which may modify the 
reactions of others, evoking the emotion cycle that our theory asserts (See Figure 1).  
Emotion as Information about Others 
Emotion can be viewed as channeling information about the emotive individual and 
his or her social situation (for similar views see Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; 
                                                  
4 We recognize that manifestations of emotion may be manufactured to convey "intentional messages" and to 
achieve various goals (Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols, 2003), and so 
can represent strategic actions taken by an agent, similar to other strategic self-presentation steps (Jones & 
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Fridlund, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Hess, Adams & Kleck, 2004; Hess, Banse & 
Kappas, 1995; Izard, 1971; Morris & Keltner, 2000). From this perspective, emotions are 
messages that an agent – intentionally or not – transmits to others and that, like other 
messages, can influence the emotions, attributions and ensuing behaviors of others, 
potentially evoking a feedback process to the original agent.  
At the most basic level, an agent's display of emotion offers information about what 
this agent is feeling at a given moment. As we discuss below, this can lead to two types of 
influence over other people's emotions. First, it can influence the emotions felt by 
observers, whether they develop the same emotions as the agent (in a process of mimicking, 
or emotion contagion) or different ones (in a process of emotion interpretation which 
creates an emotion in the other person, and hence an "emotion conversation" between agent 
and other). In addition, observations of agents' emotions can trigger associations and 
assumptions about the emotive agent, such as his status or degree of power (Aguinis, 
Simonsen & Pierce, 1998; Knudson, 1996; Tiedens, 2001), thus leading to various 
attributions or assumptions that extend the meaning of an emotion. Our review below of 
available evidence for each of these three initial influences of agent emotion is a lead-in to 
our claim that these influences can themselves become a source of influence both over 
other people and over the agent him- or her-self. 
Initial Influences of Agent Emotion:  
Emotion Contagion, Emotion Conversation and Extracting 
Meaning from an Emotion  
The most evident social influence of emotion is its capacity to evoke emotion in 
other people, be they the target of the emotion (or partners to an emotion interaction) or 
third-party observers. To cite an obvious example, being the object of agents' anger can 
create feelings of unpleasantness, frustration, anger or fear (Berkowitz, 1990; Cote, 2005; 
Hochschild, 1983; Smith & Hart, 1994). Even more telling, observing an angry encounter Emotion cycles – Page 11 
can create frustration, anxiety and emotional exhaustion not only in direct targets of the 
anger, but in uninvolved observers as well (cf. Rupp & Spencer, 2006).  
Exactly how agents' feelings evoke feelings in others has received limited attention, 
but available research suggests that this may occur through mimicking, in which the 
emotion felt by an agent is presumably transferred to others, or through emotion 
interpretation in which the evoked emotion differs from that of the agent but forms either a 
complement or counterpoint to it. These various influences, as noted in Figure 1 may not be 
independent, as they may work in concert or interact in different ways: e.g., inferences 
drawn about an emotive agent can themselves provoke emotions in others, while emotions 
resulting from emotion contagion may motivate inferences concerning the agent. Research 
is far from allowing us to identify the exact sequence of these influences and their 
interrelations, but does suggest them to be conceptually distinct processes that are 
consistent with the idea of emotion cycles.  
1. Mimicking – Spreading of Emotion through Emotion Contagion. People tend to 
converge in their emotions to those around them, a process Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson 
(1994) defined as emotion contagion, suggesting that moods and emotions spread among 
individuals much like viruses. Hatfield et al. (1994:5) suggested that emotion contagion 
occurs because people tend to automatically and unconsciously mimic non-verbal 
expressions, be they evident in the face, voice, or body. Figure 2 exemplifies such a 
process: an agent's anger leads to an observer's anger, which may lead to further anger of 
the original agent and by that create a cycle of emotion mimicking.  
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about Here 
____________________________________ 
Barsade (2002) documented emotion contagion in laboratory groups involving 
verbal exchanges: Participants in a group session with a stranger who displayed certain Emotion cycles – Page 12 
emotions reported feeling these emotions. But Rafaeli et al. (2007) suggest that contagion 
may not require non-verbal cues, since they found mimicking to occur in interactions 
involving verbal exchanges alone. Evidence also exists for the occurrence of mimicking in 
dyadic interactions. Bager & Grandey (2006), for example, found customers to smile more 
when assisted by a smiling customer service employee. And Van Kleef, De Dreu and 
Manstead (2004a) found self-reported emotions of negotiation partners to be affected by the 
emotions of their opponents (the agents). In the Van Kleef et al. (2004a) study individuals 
negotiating with an opponent who was manipulated by the researchers to appear angry 
reported greater anger than participants negotiating with opponents who appeared happy or 
non-emotional.  
It is noteworthy that people appear to be aware of emotion contagion effects: 
Hendriks and Vingerhoets (2006), for instance, asked observers how they would expect to 
feel if they were to meet individuals pictured with certain emotion expressions. Participants 
who were exposed to pictures of someone crying were more likely to expect that they 
would feel sad than were participants shown pictures of agents expressing anger, fear or no 
emotion. These effects were shown for specific emotions (e.g., anger or sadness), but 
mimicking can also occur with general emotion states or moods. For example, Sy et al. 
(2005) found that the moods of leaders, whether positive or negative, were transferred to 
group members. 
The spread of emotion from agents to others can impact the unfolding of 
interactions between them. As De Dreu et al. (2001:202) note, "Emotions, and especially 
the expression of emotions, thus have an important function in the creation, but also the 
destruction of social relationships." These effects can transcend the dyad, to influence 
group dynamics. Sy et al. (2005) found that groups led by leaders who were in good spirits 
exhibited more coordination and expended less effort than groups whose leaders were 
gloomy or ill-humored. Likewise, Barsade (2002) showed that when emotion contagion Emotion cycles – Page 13 
disseminated positive emotion amongst group members, the members reported better 
cooperation and sense of task performance along with decreased conflicts. In contrast, one 
group member who experiences negative emotion, as discussed by Felps et al (2006) can be 
a "bad apple" that damages the performance of the entire group. Pugh (2001) extended the 
idea of emotion contagion to the customer-service context, showing that a display of 
positive emotions by employees led customers to "catch" these emotions, improving the 
quality of the relationship between them and resulting in customer evaluations of better 
service quality.  
Thus, emotions that people witness in agents can influence their interactions and 
future relationships with the agent. These dynamics can then come back to influence the 
originating emotive agent (Cote, 2005). The individual who creates a good group feeling by 
displaying positive emotions, for example, will likely feel even better after seeing the 
positive emotions of his or her group members. Individual emotion therefore becomes both 
a cause and a consequence of the emotions and behaviors of others. The suggested process 
of positive cycles may be a between-person or multi-person version of the "upward spirals" 
that Fredrickson and Joiner (2002) suggested occur within persons. But an emotion cycle 
need not always entail a spiral-like process, since it may involve fluctuations in the 
intensity of emotions or in the type of emotion experienced, rather than an escalation in the 
intensity of a given emotion.    
In aggregate, the emotion cycle can be predicted to connect emotions of individuals 
and emotions of a group. In groups with one sour agent (as in the example with which we 
opened), other people may become sour because of mimicking, creating a negative 
ambience which would amplify the ill humor of the original agent and create a generally 
sour climate in the group (see also Felps et al., 2006). The original emotion of an agent may 
arise from external conditions or individual dispositions, but the ensuing emotions will be a 
product of the interpersonal emotion cycle. Such effects were described by Cote (2005) Emotion cycles – Page 14 
with respect to the effects of emotion regulation on work strain, and by Andersson and 
Pearson (1999) with respect to effects of incivility in the workplace. 
However, mimicking may not always explain the effects of agent emotion on 
ensuing interactions. Barger and Grandey (2006) and Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul and 
Gremler (2006), for example, did not find customer smiles to mediate the relationship 
between employee smiling and evaluations of service quality. And Van Kleef et al.'s 
findings (2004a) that others conceded more to an angry than to a pleasant agent raise doubts 
about the prevalence of emotion contagion influences. If contagion were to explain the 
effects of negotiating with angry agents, for example, then greater concessions would be 
expected with happy than with angry negotiators, since happy people can be expected to 
concede more than angry people.  
Van Kleef et al. (2004a) interpreted the lack of support for the mimicking 
hypothesis to indicate a process of "emotion tracking," wherein the emotion of an agent 
leads negotiation partners (the other) to make assumptions about the agent's negotiation 
limits. In this "tracking" sense, emotions of an agent (e.g., anger rather than happiness) 
convey information about how close an offer on the table is to the agent's limit, which in 
turn determines the demands likely to be made by others. Emotion, in this case, is 
influential through the information it affords, rather than through mimicking, as elaborated 
below. 
2. Emotion Interpretation. Whereas mimicking was suggested to create a process 
of emotion contagion, people engaged in sense-making of an agent's emotion can also 
engage in emotion interpretation; by interpretation we mean that individuals perceive an 
agent as feeling a particular emotion and react with complementary or situationally 
appropriate emotions of their own. With mimicking people converge in the way they feel 
with others around them, while in emotion interpretation the feelings of others diverge from 
and in some way compliment the feelings of the original agent.  Emotion cycles – Page 15 
To illustrate, in our opening example, some people may become angry with the 
department head or the complaining faculty member, but others may become irritated, 
frustrated or worried because of the anger around them; still others might feel 
embarrassment or apprehension through identifying with the department head (Averill, 
1983). People do not react identically to all emotion-laden situations, perhaps partly 
because of individual differences (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1980; Hoffman, 1982). But the 
emotions of others will always in some way be a reaction that responds to or is 
complimentary to the emotion of the agent.  
The dynamics of emotion interpretation describe instances where emotion is guided 
by situational scripts (Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Demorest & Alexander, 1992) or the 
relational themes associated with a given emotion (Lazarus, 1991). Relational themes can 
best be conceived of as the stories that a given emotion tells, with each type of emotion 
having its own unique story (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1985). The story related by anger, for example, is that a 
demeaning offense has been made (Lazarus, 1991: 222), while the story conveyed by envy 
is that others have something that I want (Lazarus, 1991: 254). Research confirms that 
people generally agree about the themes conveyed by different emotions (e.g., Scherer, 
1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and that these associations are elicited by observations of 
other people's (agents') emotions (Hareli, Rafaeli & Parkinson, forthcoming; Tiedens et al., 
2000; Weiner, 1995, 2005).  
Observing an agent's emotion can, therefore, evoke in an observer an emotion script 
or theme which can produce (in the observer) emotions which relate to those of the agent 
without necessarily being the same. A given emotion may evoke different emotions in 
different people: displays of grief may create feelings of sadness in others (through 
mimicking), but may equally well produce pity, compassion or empathy in others (cf. 
Clark, Ouellette, Powell & Milberg, 1987; Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller & Miller, 1989; Emotion cycles – Page 16 
Feshbach, 1975; Stotland, Matthews, Sherman, Hansson & Richardson, 1978). The grief of 
one person may even lead to happiness in another if the person experiencing grief is 
considered by the observer as an enemy (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). In each case, the emotion 
developed by others produces a social (emotion) conversation initiated by the agent's 
original emotion. Figure 3 describes an example of an emotion conversation in which one 
person's (Person A's) initial anger evoked fear in a second person (Person B); noticing the 
fear reaction of the observer (Person B) leads the originally angry person (Person A) to feel 
embarrassment, which leads to a feeling of relief by the second person (Person B). The 
cycle depicted in Figure 3 is, of course, one of many possible cycles. For example, the fear 
of Person B may lead to an escalation of the anger of Person A, leading him or her to 
hostility (rather than embarrassment as depicted in Figure 3), which can lead Person B to 
feel greater fear (rather than the relief suggested in Figure 3).  
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 3 about Here 
____________________________________ 
This view extends the idea of emotion as an inter-person rather than intra-person 
communicative device. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996: 372) advanced a "Communicative 
Theory of Emotion," according to which emotions of an agent signal key messages to other 
parts of the agent's mental system. An inter-personal extension of this idea that fits with our 
emotion-cycle theory is that emotions signal various things to other people. Such signaling 
is mutual, so others' responses to an agent's emotion can reciprocally influence the agent, as 
depicted in Figure 3. This process has been described with respect to the evolution of inter-
personal trust, for example (Weber et al., 2005) and with respect to emotion regulation 
(Cote, 2005), and therefore likely exists with a host of emotions. 
The emotion interpretation and reaction cycle between others and agents may 
involve feelings of others about themselves (e.g., sadness or guilt), about the emotive agent Emotion cycles – Page 17 
(e.g., anger), or about the situation (e.g., fear or worry). People can feel victimized, for 
example, when they encounter aggressive agents (Nadler, 2003) and people can develop 
affection toward agents who are sad rather than angry (Clark et al., 1996; Knudson, 1996), 
or happy rather than angry (Clark & Taraban, 1991). These effects may extend to 
unexpected contexts: Savitsky and Sim (1974) documented emotion interpretation and 
ensuing reactions with emotions of defendants reporting the details of a crime.  
Only limited research has explored the phenomenon of emotion interpretation in 
organizational realms. Lewis (2000) showed that anger on the part of CEOs evoked fear 
and nervousness in others, while displays of sadness by CEOs elicited fatigue and low 
enthusiasm. Smith and Hart (1994) confirmed an influence of patients' anger on nurses' 
emotions, showing that nurses who were confronted by angry patients felt fearful and 
intimidated. And Frost, Dutton, Worline and Wilson (2000) documented how pain and 
suffering in organizational colleagues can produce compassion in others, and motivate 
offers of help and support. Frost et al. (2000) suggest that factors within the organization 
can facilitate or hinder compassionate responses, suggesting the importance of context to 
emotion interpretation and the reactions it evokes. This analysis also highlights the cyclical 
nature of emotion interpretation and reaction: expressions of compassion are suggested to 
elevate the sense of security of pained agents, which is likely to help them regain 
composure and return to more positive emotions, which in turn would reduce feelings of 
empathy and compassion in others.  
Agents' emotions may inspire emotions in others who are not the direct targets or 
even direct witnesses of the emotion. Similar to Goffman's (1981:124) idea of 'footings' of 
human discourse, non-involved third-party observers can become aware of the emotions of 
agents and feel certain emotions even if they have not interacted directly with the agent. For 
example, Rupp and Spencer (2006) report that observing a customer behaving angrily 
toward a co-worker led employees to feel frustration and exhaustion, much as if the anger Emotion cycles – Page 18 
were directed at them. Rafaeli, Rozilio, Ravid and Derfler (2006c) reported that employees 
who read scenarios in which a customer behaved angrily toward another employee reported 
a sense of frustration and burnout. Raz and Rafaeli (2007) further found that when a 
manager in Japan displayed shame to another manager, the first manager's subordinates felt 
sad and guilty in response.   
Emotion 'footing' can also occur in a process referred to as 'social sharing of 
emotions,' wherein people hear about emotional episodes experienced by an agent (Rimé et 
al., 1991) and react accordingly. Being told about the meeting with which we opened, for 
example, could arouse feelings in people who were not there in person. Christophe and 
Rimé (1997) noted that the nature and intensity of emotion created by social sharing is 
likely to reflect the nature and intensity of the emotion in the original experience. Here as 
well, the emotion interpretation and reaction cycle can continue through multiple rounds: 
agents' shared stories evoke emotions in others, which will influence the emotions of the 
recounting agent, which may modify the emotions felt by the other. In this vein, Hareli and 
Eisikovits (2006) looked at situations in which one person apologized after offending a 
friend. When the apologizing party said the apology was induced by feelings of guilt or 
shame, the anger of the offended party was reduced, but, when pity was cited as the reason 
for the apology, the initial anger intensified despite the apparent effort at reconciliation.  
As elaborated next, mimicking and emotion interpretation and reaction are only two 
of the three possible ways in which individual emotions can influence other people. The 
third is a process in which individuals draw on the emotions agents display to make various 
inferences, and these inferences themselves affect others' (and eventually also agents') 
emotions and/or behaviors.   
3. Drawing Inferences from Emotion – Extending the Meaning of an Emotion.  
Human behavior is often governed by inferences about other people and the 
attributions they evoke. As noted above, appraisal theories of emotion suggest that Emotion cycles – Page 19 
emotions can "tell a story" about the individual experiencing the emotion (Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991). Building on such stories people may not only react emotionally, as 
suggested above, but may also draw inferences about emotive agents. By extension, an 
agent presumed to be experiencing anger may also be presumed to have been let down, 
offended, or disobeyed by someone (Tiedens, 2001), which could endow him or her with 
high power (Tiedens, 2002b), which is a key element of the story of anger (Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1985). Thus, knowledge of an agents' emotion can lead others to presume 
knowledge of other things about the agent; the presumed knowledge extends the meaning 
of an emotion to afford information about the agent in addition to how he or she is feeling.  
Available research suggests that agent emotions can inspire inferences and 
attributions of three types: (a) the social status or power of an emotive agent; (b) the 
competence of the agent; and (c) the credibility of the agent.   
(a) Agent Emotion and Others' Inferences about Social Power.  
Perhaps because of the central role of power in social interactions (Aguinis, 
Simonsen & Pierce, 1998; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003; Kemper, 1987), and the 
well-established link between emotion and power (cf. Scherer, 1984), agents' emotions 
seem to influence others' assumptions about power and status; anger, for example, is 
viewed as high power and fear or sadness as low power (Conway, DiFazio & Mayman, 
1999; Hess, Herrera & Bourgeois, 1999; Kemper, 1987; Scherer 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). This link seems to lead people to judge social power based on emotions; since power 
is inherently (at minimum) dyadic, inferences about power relate to both agents' and others' 
(observers') status (Kluger and Rafaeli, 2000). Tiedens (2001), for example, documented 
that agents displaying anger are presumed to hold higher organizational status than agents 
displaying sadness and guilt, a finding that may explain why emotions were described by 
Oatley, Keltner and Jenkins (2006) as means for establishing and maintaining inter-
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Aguinis et al. (1998) explicitly suggested that emotions can inspire attributions of 
whether or to what extent agents are privy to the sources of power identified by French and 
Raven (1959)
5. In their study, uninvolved observers viewed a bank employee who was 
either nervous or relaxed in a conversation with a colleague and reported the power they 
presumed the employee held. The observers attributed lower referent, reward, and 
legitimate power to the nervous (relative to the relaxed) employee. The dynamics of self-
fulfilling prophecies (Eden, 1984) easily suggest that such assumptions connecting 
emotions to power can evolve into actual power dynamics between an agent and others. 
Thus, agent emotions and the inferences they inspire in others can solidify power relations 
in dyads (see also Tiedens, 2000b) and the relationships between members of such dyads. 
Figure 4 depicts an example of such an emotion cycle and its consequences.   
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 about Here 
____________________________________ 
That agent emotion affects others' inferences about power or status can also help 
explain assertions that affect in groups helps promote group coordination (Spoor & Kelly, 
2004). Affect of individual members provides information to other members about relative 
status and roles within the group, which helps coordinate assumptions about group 
leadership (Van de Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 1976). The cyclical process we advance 
therefore suggests that initial emotions expressed by certain agents in a group can lead to 
assumptions of others about the relative status of these agents, which paves the way to 
shared assumptions among all members regarding the distribution of power in the group.  
                                                  
5 French and Raven (1959) defined five sources of power: Reward power comes from the ability to provide 
positive outcomes to others; coercive power comes from the ability to punish others; legitimate power comes 
from the ability to request others to behave in a specific way because of one's formal social position; referent 
power comes from the ability to make another behave in a certain way because of the other's desire to be 
similar to or associated with the influencing agent; and expert power comes from having unique knowledge, 
training or skill.  
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(b) Agent Emotion and Others' Inferences about Agent Competence. 
  Building on the 'cognitive model of emotion' advanced by Smith and Ellsworth 
(1985), Tiedens (2001) focused on inferences of competence from agent affect and showed 
that politicians or work colleagues who express anger are judged as more competent (and 
less likable) than those who express sadness. A link between perceived competence and 
emotions has practical implications in terms of people's decisions to allot rewards or 
punishments to an agent. Tiedens (2001), for example, found others' willingness to vote for 
a politician to be associated with the politician's expressions of anger (versus guilt, sadness 
or embarrassment). Rafaeli and Pratt (2004) found that observers judged employees' 
chances of promotion to be higher when the employee displayed anger following a failure 
than when the employee displayed guilt in the same context. Rafaeli, Ravid, Derfler, 
Feigenbaum, Maw-Der and Hwee-Hoon (2006a) connected expressions of anger by a 
customer to others' tendency to reward the customer. Here as well the dynamics of a self-
fulfilling prophecy likely energize an emotion cycle (Eden, 1984): If emotion (e.g., anger) 
of an agent (e.g., customer) lead to a tendency to reward the customer, customers will likely 
learn that it is a good idea to convey anger because it increases the probability of a reward. 
Consistent with this logic, Rafaeli et al. (2006b) found that people around the world 
presume that they should express anger toward customer service reps. 
Interestingly, observers report that their own likely behavioral tendencies vis-à-vis 
an emotive agent are different from how they think others would behave. The people 
studied by Tiedens (2001) claimed they would personally prefer to hire an employee who 
reported feeling regret (rather than anger) following a failure, but that the employee feeling 
anger was more likely to be awarded a higher status if hired. Rafaeli et al. (2006c) found a 
similar discrepancy between reports of self vs. other in the context of promotion and 
customer service decisions; they suggest this discrepancy to be a specific case of 'naïve 
realism' and individual blind-spots described by Ross and Ward (1996) with regard to other Emotion cycles – Page 22 
within-person judgments. However, Rafaeli et al. (2006c) suggest that culture may 
moderate this phenomenon, since it was observed among study subjects in Israel but not in 
Singapore.  
A link between agent emotion and competence is also evident with positive 
emotions. Tiedens, Ellsworth and Mesquita (2000) noted that, in the context of an 
organizational success, observers assumed greater competence and higher status in agents 
who displayed pride than in agents who displayed gratitude or appreciation. These 
dynamics also surface in judgments of leadership quality: When Lewis (2000) asked 
subordinates to judge supervisors on various parameters such as communication skills, 
likeability as a boss, ability to do a good job, and leadership ability, the results showed a 
clear relationship between these ratings and reported positive emotions of the supervisor.  
(c) Agent Emotion and Others' Inferences about Agent Credibility  
The influence of agents' emotions on judgments about their credibility was also 
reported by Aguinis et al. (1998), who defined credibility as truthfulness and follow-
through on promises; the authors suggest a link between attributed credibility and agent 
nervousness. Consistent with this assertion are Hareli and Shomrat's (work in progress) 
findings that anger reduces credibility: managers interviewing failing employees were more 
likely to discount the reports of employees who behaved angrily than those of employees 
who showed no emotion.  
Studies of court decisions using a mock-jury methodology also show an influence of 
agent emotions on decisions about credibility. The emotion accompanying a statement from 
a "victim," for example, can influence perceptions of the truthfulness of the victim's report. 
Generally, both too much and too little emotion seems to lower credibility (Golding, 
Fryman, Marsil & Yozwiak, 2003). Credibility is improved when victim statements are 
accompanied by situation-congruent affect, rather than presented in a neutral or indifferent 
tone (Golding et al., 2003; Kaufmann, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid & Magnussen, 2003).  Emotion cycles – Page 23 
Congruence between the content of a given message or context and the emotion an 
agent displays appears to be critical for credibility outside the courtroom as well. For 
example, we expect observers to judge as more credible an agent who displays fear in a 
threatening situation than one who -- in the same context -- expresses some incongruous 
emotion (like delight). Some support for this assertion is offered by Robbins and DeNisi 
(1994; 1998), who argued that affect congruence is related to performance ratings, and also 
by Hareli, Hess, Harush, Suleiman, Cossette, Lavoie and Dugay (2007a), who examined the 
effects of emotion displayed by customers while voicing a complaint, and found greater 
credibility when a complaint was voiced in an angry rather than a neutral or pleasant tone.  
However, the influence of affect on credibility is not absolute: in the Hareli et al. 
(2007a) study this phenomenon was observed only if the legitimacy of the customer's 
complaint was uncertain; when complaints seemed either highly legitimate or clearly 
illegitimate, expressions of anger reduced the complainant's credibility, perhaps because it 
created a sense of "bullying". Alternatively, the loss of credibility may be due to aroused 
suspicion because of a presumed 'over-justification' on the agent's part (Tang & Hall, 1995). 
An attempt to win over the observer by force of multiple and redundant argumentation can 
arouse suspicion.    
In short, limited but consistent research supports a relationship between 
observations of agents' emotions and both others' emotions and their judgments of agents' 
power, competence and credibility. As developed next, these influences may extend to 
various facets of others' behaviors, and in particular – as exemplified in Figure 4 – their 
behavior vis-à-vis the agent. More importantly, these influences may feed back to the agent, 
serving to influence his or her emotions or behaviors, creating an emotion cycle. In this 
cycle agent emotion may be a trigger but may also be an outcome of others' emotions, 
behaviors, or attributions.  Emotion cycles – Page 24 
Agent Emotion and Others' Behaviors  
Frijda (1986:13) described the expression of emotion as an act that "establishes or 
enhances, weakens or breaks … contact with … the environment, " which suggests that 
emotions and the inferences and emotions they elicit in others also influence the behavior 
of others (see also Frijda, 1997; Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Reisenzein & 
Hofmann, 1990; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). Limited research has documented such 
effects (for some exceptions documenting individual level effects see Hareli et al., 2007a, 
Rafaeli et al., 2007, Rafaeli & Pratt, 2004, Rafaeli et al., 2007, Tiedens, 2001, Van Kleef et 
al., 2004a, 2004b; and exceptions documenting effects on performance of groups see 
Barsade, 2000, Rafaeli et al., 2006c and Rafaeli et al., 2007). The emotion cycle argument 
would further suggest a spreading process, wherein initial positive or negative emotions of 
one or two members evoke emotions and behaviors in other people present, which can 
influence group performance and also feed back to influence the original agent.   
One key set of behaviors likely to be influenced by emotion cycles is the evolution 
of a continued interaction or a long-term relationship. As illustrated by our opening 
example, emotion can influence individuals' sense of approach or avoidance toward each 
other (Kuppens, Van Mechelen & Meulders, 2004). This suggests emotion to be similar to 
physical cues in an environment, which have been shown to ignite approach or avoidance in 
onlookers (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978; Russell & Pratt, 1980). In general, because 
negative valance is associated with a withdrawal while positive valance is linked to 
approach (e.g., Gray, 1990, 1994), negative emotion can be expected to lead to distancing 
or disengagement behaviors, whereas positive emotion is expected to lead to approach or 
connecting behaviors. Notwithstanding, specific emotions sharing the same valance may 
also have different and even contrasting effects on observers. For example, fear and anger 
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anger of agents. Anger may lead others to distance themselves from the agent while fear of 
an agent may motivate approach so as to support the agent or reduce his or her fear.  
Little research has used a discrete emotions approach to examine the effects of 
specific emotions on others' behavior. But whatever the exact nature of these effects they 
inevitably feed the emotion cycle: approach (or avoidance) behaviors further ignite 
emotions in agents and others.  These effects can carry bottom-line implications: 
Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson (2006), for example, argued that positive emotions 
improve the chances that people will desire a future business relationship with an agent. 
The "footing" process described by Goffman (1981), which we discussed above in 
terms of the effects of emotions on uninvolved observers, also likely occurs with effects of 
agent emotion on others' approach or avoidance. People are likely to seek proximity to (i.e., 
to approach) agents who display pleasant and positive emotion, but to stay away from 
(avoid) agents who display unpleasant emotion (e.g., anger, hostility, misery or distrust) (cf. 
Berkowitz, 1990; Weber et al., 2005). The anger of the attacking faculty member at the 
meeting with which we opened most likely would not increase your desire to work closely 
with this person. On the positive side, the pleasant emotion of success may explain people's 
quest to bask in the glory of others who are successful (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, 
Freeman & Sloan, 1976).   
The cyclical effects of agent emotion also occur at the group level. Individuals are 
known, for example, to have an innate need for social interactions (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995), and probably as a result of that report more positive emotions when working in a 
team than when working alone (West & Patterson, 1999). Working with others can also 
create various emotions among individual team members, which themselves can influence 
the attractiveness of working in a group (DeDreu et al, 2001). Spoor and Kelly's (2004) 
analysis extends this idea to suggest that affect in groups influences cohesion and 
coordination in groups. Pleasant or positive emotion is likely to attract or encourage Emotion cycles – Page 26 
approach toward the group as a whole, while negative or unpleasant emotion is likely to 
inspire avoidance and to hamper cohesion (Felps et al., 2006; Walter & Bruch, 2007). The 
emotion cycle in the faculty meeting with which we opened can clearly dampen the 
cohesion of a faculty far beyond the meeting itself.  
The effects of one person's emotion may extend to multiple others, including the 
direct targets of the emotion, other people who see this emotion exchange, or other people 
who hear about it from any of the people who saw it. As we described individual group 
members witnessing one member's emotion can mimic or react to this emotion, as 
graphically depicted in Figure 1. The positive emotion of one member, for example, can 
start a process of positive spirals leading to overall more positive emotion in the group 
(Walter & Bruch, 2007). A complimentary influence of one agent's emotion may be 
"second hand" influence: the influence of an agent over one other person can influence a 
third "other" person. For example, as depicted in Figure 5, Person C's witnessing the 
emotional response of another group member (Person B) to the emotion expressed by an 
agent (Person A) can influence the response of Person C. In addition, other members (D 
and E) who do not see Person A or B may hear about the emotion exchange from Person C 
and develop their own emotions in response, which can influence their behavior toward 
Person A. In Felps's et al (2006) terms, one agent's emotion can create a process of 
spillover of emotion from an individual to members of his or her work group.  
______________________ 
Insert Figure 5 about Here 
______________________ 
In short, behavior toward an agent and proneness to interacting with the agent are 
contingent upon the emotions the agent displays, and may influence others directly as well 
as influence third party others, or other members of the agent's work group. The effects 
may also feed back to the agent through the approach or avoidance toward the agent Emotion cycles – Page 27 
developed by others. These effects may be mediated by others' emotion (through a process 
of mimicking or emotion interpretation and reaction, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3 
respectively) or by inferences drawn about the emotive agent (as depicted in Figure 4). 
Empirical documentation of the mediation of mimicking, emotion interpretation or drawing 
inferences is still wanting. But our review of available research suggests that one of these 
processes must explain the social influence of emotion since we found no theoretical or 
empirical support for a direct effect of one person's emotion on another person's behavior.  
Summary: Effects of One Person's Emotions on Others  
Our review of available research suggests that emotions manifested by one person 
can affect others who are the direct targets of such emotions as well as uninvolved 
observers or third parties. One person's emotions can induce comparable emotions in others 
(because of mimicking), but also different emotions (because of emotion interpretation and 
reaction or because of inferences drawn about an emotive agent). Inferences inspired by 
emotion are likely to regard the social power, competence and credibility of the agent, and 
behaviors of others in relation to an agent are also affected by the agent's emotions, 
especially the tendency to approach or distance oneself from the agent.  
However, the distinction between agent and other is suggested by our review to be 
shortsighted, because the roles of agent and other may reverse, as depicted in Figure 1: 
others' emotions become precursors to rather than outcomes of agents' emotions. The 
emotion of one person influences the emotion and/or behavior of another person, which 
returns to influence – solidify or modify – the emotion of the first person. These emotion 
cycles can begin to explain emotion dynamics at the group or organizational level, and can 
also explain other phenomena such as dyad, group or organizational cohesion or morale. 
Because emotion cycles do not occur in a vacuum, and emotion always occurs within a 
given context various factors may intervene and moderate the unfolding of the emotion 
cycle as we develop next.        Emotion cycles – Page 28 
Contingencies of the Effects of Agent Emotion on Others  
Various factors can modify three aspects of the fashion with which a particular  
cycle unfolds: (a) the nature of the emotion associated with an agent (e.g., the extent to 
which an agent is presumed to feel angry, rather than sad or happy); (b) the extent to which 
other people notice and react to an emotion associated with an agent (e.g., the extent to 
which the other person is aware of an agent's anger, sadness or happiness); and (c) the way 
in which the other person is influenced by this emotion (e.g., the extent to which the other 
person mimics, draws inferences from, or develops a sense of approach or avoidance in 
response to an agent's anger, sadness, or happiness).  
These effects raise questions about the evolution of the emotion cycles we have 
attempted to describe. For example, if our discussion thus far regarded how anger of an 
agent may affect other people, here we raise questions such as: When is an agent's anger 
likely to be seen as anger rather than frustration? What conditions amplify (or attenuate) the 
effects of an agent's anger on observers? When is an observer likely to respond to agent 
anger with anger (or mimicking) and when with fear (or emotion interpretation and 
reaction)? Research on such moderating effects is very limited, but the key categories of 
potential moderators that we could identify are demographic factors (e.g., race or gender); 
situational factors (e.g., current power relations or time constraints); and issues regarding 
the authenticity and perceived appropriateness of an agent's emotion in a given situation.  
(a) Demographic properties of agent and others. Labeling and identification of 
emotions are subject to various biases that draw on contextual information (Kirouac & 
Hess, 1999), notably gender, culture and race. In a noteworthy experiment, Plant, Kling and 
Smith (2004) showed the influence of apparent gender (i.e., gender as apparent from 
physical appearance) on the interpretation of ambiguous emotional expressions. 
Participants rated the intensity of emotions expressed by agents in photos in which the 
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presumed gender. The emotion expressed by the agent – an ambiguous combination of 
anger and sadness – was interpreted by observers in a stereotype-consistent manner: agents 
thought to be female were more likely to be seen as displaying sadness, and agents thought 
to be male were more likely to be seen as displaying anger.  
Given known gender biases in negotiation behaviors, such labeling can influence 
the reactions of others which may, in turn, weaken or strengthen the bargaining position of 
a negotiator (Kray & Thompson, 2005). For example, a negotiator presuming a counterpart 
is female may interpret various actions to represent sadness rather than anger, and as Van 
Kleef et al (2005) showed this could lead to higher demands and a weakening of the 
counterpart's position. Under the same circumstances a presumption that one's counterpart 
is male would lead to the presumption that he or she is angry, which Van Kleef et al. would 
argue could empower the counterpart and improve his financial gains. 
Gender may influence not only how emotions are read, but also whether others 
mimic, respond, or draw inferences from these emotions. Rafaeli (1989) showed, for 
example, that male customers are more likely to receive smiles from employees, and 
connected this finding to the relative status of males and females. DeStano, Bartlett and 
Salovey (2002) suggested gender differences in the emergence of envy, and Lewis (2000) 
reported a gender gap in the effectiveness attributed to male and female leaders in relation 
to their emotions: Male leaders received lower effectiveness ratings by subordinates who 
viewed them as expressing sadness, while female leaders received lower ratings when they 
were seen as expressing either sadness or anger. Affect and gender may therefore interact in 
their influence on attributions drawn by others: Agents are assumed to be more capable or 
accomplished when affect is congruent with gender expectations and less competent when 
there is incongruent affect (Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen & Manstead, 2004; Robinson & 
Johnson, 1997). Once again, self-fulfilling prophecy dynamics seem to be at work here, 
since initial expectations drawn from presumed attributions can become reality.  Emotion cycles – Page 30 
A second key contextual factor is culture, with cultural differences, cultural 
similarity and cultural biases playing a role. For example, Raz and Rafaeli (2007) suggest 
that the same organizational situation can lead to presumptions of shame in Japan and guilt 
in the USA, suggesting cultural differences in the emotions that agents are presumed to 
hold (see also Wallbott & Scherer, 2005). Shimoda, Argyle and Ricci-Bitti (1978) found 
that English and Italian observers interpreted each other’s emotions more accurately than 
those of agents who were Japanese, suggesting the importance of cultural congruence. And 
Holden and Hogan (1993) suggested cultural biases in interpretation of emotions: English 
speakers tended to rate utterances made by agents speaking in a Russian accent as angrier 
than those made by agents speaking with an English accent.  
Cultural similarity may influence the extent to which emotion information is 
encoded, because people are known to readily confuse individuals who belong to another 
race or ethnic group (i.e., "all Chinese people look alike to me"), and people are better at 
recognizing the emotions of members of their own social group (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002). Such culture effects appear to fade away, however, with certain emotions and in 
particular anger. Ackerman, Shapiro, Neuberg, Kenrick, Becker, Griskevicius, Maner and 
Schaller (2006) asked white participants to view black and white faces displaying either 
neutral or angry expressions, and then to identify these faces. White viewers showed the 
out-group homogeneity bias in the accuracy of recognition of neutral faces; the bias was 
entirely eliminated for angry black faces, suggesting that the emotion (anger) overcame the 
cultural similarity bias. 
That certain emotions override racial and cultural cues can be explained by the 
signal value of emotion: anger signals threat, a critical thing to notice. The race or culture 
of an agent can also act as a source of information about emotion, leading people to be 
more likely to associate particular emotions with specific agents. In the U.S., for example, 
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Heald-Moore, 1995). Demographic factors – such as political affiliation – may also 
override the effect of manifested emotions. In a study by Stroud et al. (2005), observers 
watched a speech by a congressional candidate who was either emotionally expressive or 
non-expressive. When the candidates' party affiliation was known, observers were more 
likely to prefer candidates belonging to the party they supported and the emotion expressed 
had no effect on observers' preferences. In the absence of information about candidates' 
party affiliation, observers preferred the expressive over the non-expressive candidate and 
the emotion of the agent (the congressional candidate) did impact observers.  
The effects of gender, culture and other demographic variables are almost certainly 
more complicated than we currently recognize, given the many possible interactions 
between demographic properties of the agent and of the other. Available research is too 
preliminary to offer many clear statements, but can be summarized as suggesting 
congruence as a key issue, specifically (a) congruence between agents' emotions and others' 
expectations seems to influence the effects of agent emotions; and (b) congruence between 
agent and other in demographic variables is material to these effects.  
(b) Relative power and emotion cycles. The power dynamics between the people 
involved is likely to be a key influence over any emotion cycle. Differences in power 
inevitably develop in social relationships (Anderson, John, Keltner & Kring, 2001; Gray-
Little & Burks, 1983; Owens & Sutton, 2001; Savin-Williams, 1979; Sulloway, 1996), and 
are known to influence how people behave and how social interactions and relationships 
unfold (Keltner et al., 2003; Kemper, 1987). Power relations are particularly influential in 
organizational settings, where the relative power of agent and other is automatically 
established by formally assigned roles (Konst, Vonk & Van der Vlist, 1999). Power can 
therefore be presumed to qualify the extent to which others are attentive to and influenced 
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Limited research, however, has connected power within an organization to emotion. 
Most available research suggests that people tend to pay greater attention to, and mimic the 
behavior of, those with more power (Fiske, 1993; Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Newcomb, 
1943). Snodgrass (1985) documented a negative correlation between relative status and 
attention paid to agents' emotions, with significantly more attention paid by others who 
have less power (are of lower status) than the agent. Lower power is also suggested by 
Snodgrass (1985) to improve accuracy in decoding agent emotions, but the key influence of 
relative power appears to be over the motivation to consider agents' emotions (Van Kleef et 
al., 2004b), with motivation rising as relative status falls. Since high-power individuals tend 
to shape the emotions of their less-powerful counterparts (Keltner et al., 2003; Rafaeli, 
1989), it appears that emotion cycles are likely to begin with less-powerful individuals 
mimicking the emotions of those with more power; an operational prediction therefore is 
that over time people holding less power are more likely to adopt the emotional behavior of 
higher-power agents than vice versa. Emotion spirals, such as described by Walter & Bruch 
(2007) can be refined to claim a stronger effect of high status individuals over the nature of 
an emergent spiral. One exception is Hsee et al (1990), who reported that higher power 
people were more likely to mimic the emotions of lower power individuals. But the low 
power individuals in this study were also in a high stress condition, which can explain the 
contradictory findings since high stress can reduce attention to others' emotion (Van Kleef 
et al, 2004b).  
  (c) Type and extent of exposure to agent emotion and emotion cycles. Another 
potential influence over the qualities of an emotion cycle is the nature and extent of direct 
exposure to an expressed emotion. For instance, people who were direct targets of an 
agent's anger were found by Rafaeli et al. (2007) to react differently to the emotion than 
people who read scenarios in which others were the target. Surprisingly, in the Rafaeli et al. 
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anger than over people who learned about it as third-parties, by reading about the customer 
anger. One explanation may be that employees who find themselves as targets of agent 
anger automatically engage in distraction to avoid the implications of the negative feelings 
it (customer anger) may evoke (Richards & Gross, 2000).  
But how attentive others are to agents' emotions may be limited by the degree to 
which they are mentally free to pay attention to such matters. Van Kleef et al. (2004b) 
found that negotiating parties were affected by the emotions of others under conditions of 
low but not high time pressure, suggesting that in order for an emotion cycle to emerge 
people must have available mental resources to process information about agents' emotions. 
Time pressure limits the mental resources available, as do interruptions or obstructions of 
one's work (Jett & George, 2003).  
Attentiveness may also be affected by facets of a given situation or environment, 
including features of the physical space (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978; Snodgrass, Russell & 
Ward, 1988), the appearance of the people encountered (Kluger & Rafaeli, 2000), and 
previous experiences within an organization, notably service experiences (Barger & 
Grandey, 2006; Machleit & Eroglu, 2000). Bitner's (1992) concept of "Servicescape" 
embeds the display of emotion by an organizational agent in a particular organizational 
environment, which more than likely will help define the nature of emotions read, the 
extent to which the emotions are influential, and the emergent emotion process, as well as 
the cyclical effect on the agent.  
(d) Authenticity of agents' displayed emotions. The extent and nature of an 
emergent emotion cycle may also hinge upon the extent to which emotions manifested by 
an agent are authentic (or more accurately, perceived by others as authentic). A good actor 
may be able to successfully feign emotions, but people can at times judge the authenticity 
of displayed emotions (Ekman, 1992). Non-authentic smiles have been argued to 
undermine the presumed benefits of “service with a smile” (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Emotion cycles – Page 34 
Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006; Grandey, 2000), suggesting that whether an agents' display of 
positive emotion evokes a cycle of positive emotions depends on whether the original 
emotion is viewed as authentic. Authenticity may determine, for example, whether an 
emotion cycle includes mimicking or emotion interpretation: Authentic smiles may evoke 
mimicking and produce a spread of good feeling from agent to other, while inauthentic 
smiles may evoke cynicism and produce negative reactions.  
Authenticity is particularly important if emotion accompanies other information 
about an agent. Hareli et al. (2007a) found that expressions of anger by customers made a 
complaint appear more credible only if the complaint did not appear legitimate in itself; 
with legitimate complaints, anger decreased credibility. Presumably, when the complaint 
appeared legitimate the anger was not viewed as authentic, perhaps because – as Hareli et 
al. (2007a) suggest – it created over-justification, which would reduce attentiveness to the 
emotion.  
 (e)  Appropriateness of agents' displayed emotion. 
  Emotions of an agent may or may not be viewed as appropriate by others in a given 
situation, and judgments of appropriateness may moderate various elements of emotion 
cycles. Elsbach and Kramer (2003), for example, noted that Hollywood decision-makers 
considered passion an essential emotion in those writing for the silver screen; knowing 
whether screenwriters felt passionately about their work was a critical piece of information 
for judges, and only when passion was there did judges respond with enthusiasm about the 
screen writer.  
In a similar vein, a student's anger about his or her grade may be viewed as 
inappropriate in response to a high grade, which may cause disrespect by others. Hareli, 
Klos and Rafaeli (2007) asked student observers to draw inferences about the ability of 
other students after "overhearing" them complain about a grade in an important course. 
Manipulated were the grade (higher vs. lower than class average) and the student's Emotion cycles – Page 35 
emotions about the grade (anger, guilt or sadness). Regardless of the grade itself, the 
students who expressed anger were rated as less able than those expressing guilt or sadness, 
suggesting that respondents made their judgments based on the student's emotion and the 
additional information (actual grade relative to class average), as well as norms about 
appropriate reactions to different grades (e.g., one should be satisfied with an above-
average grade, and poor performance is nobody's fault but the student's).  
In short, various factors can color the way in which emotion cycles evolve. 
Available research and theory is far too limited to provide a clear understanding of the 
exact moderation patterns, but is enough to suggest this as an important arena for additional 
research. Considering emotions as forms of communication, with each emotion conveying 
a specific message, the impact of an emotion -- similar to that of other forms of 
communication -- depends on various features of the context and background in which it 
occurs. Deciphering the evolution of emotion cycles requires an extensive research agenda 
and focused attention on some "blind spots" in available literature, as we elaborate next.  
Toward Future Research  
We have proposed a process model that begins to unpack emotion cycles in social 
interactions, in which the emotions of one person can influence the emotions, cognitions 
and behaviors of other people in a cyclical, recursive fashion. We suggest three likely initial 
effects: mimicking of emotion, producing emotion contagion between agent and others; 
emotion interpretation and reacting to emotion, evoking an emotion conversation 
between agent and others; and drawing inferences, which creates an emotion extension 
into information about an agent presumed by others. Through these processes, one person's 
emotion may spread to multiple people (through contagion effects) but can also evoke 
other emotions in other people as well as various assumptions about others (e.g., sadness Emotion cycles – Page 36 
suggests weakness and low power, while anger suggests strength and high power) and 
behaviors (e.g., approach or avoidance toward future interactions with the agent).  
Our review leads us to suggest five directions for future research: (1) What emotion 
cycles are triggered by particular emotions?  (2) Are there individual differences in 
emergent emotion cycles? (3) What are the effects of emotion cycles beyond the dyadic 
level of analysis? (4) How do emotion cycles unfold in ongoing interactions and 
relationships? And finally, (5) Why do emotion cycles even exist?  
1. What emotion cycles are triggered by particular emotions? 
Available research offers only minimal insights into what triggers mimicking, 
emotion interpretation and reaction or drawing inferences from emotion. An open question 
relates to the relationship between particular agent emotions and consequent emotion 
cycles. One possibility is a discrete emotions approach (Lazarus and Cohen-Charash, 
2001), assuming that specific emotions lead to specific reactions of others, which may 
evoke specific emotions in the original agent. Another direction may be to consider whether 
categories of emotion (e.g., high- vs. low-arousal, positive vs. negative) differently impact 
how an emotion cycle unfolds. High-arousal emotions (anger, excitement), for example, 
may be predicted to evoke more mimicking, because of the energy they embed, while low-
arousal emotions (sadness, guilt) may lead to emotion interpretation and reaction. And 
positive emotions, being more pleasant for all concerned, may invite more approach 
behavior and more creativity. This would suggest an extension of Frederickson's (2005) 
theory of "broaden and build" to include not only within-person but also between-person 
spirals.  
Affect valence may also interact with arousal, such that high arousal-negative 
emotions (anger) evoke different reactions than low-arousal negative emotions. Savitsky 
and Sim (1974) reported that sadness increased agents' likeability, while anger decreased it. 
And Rafaeli and Sutton's (1987) analysis suggests that cycles created by affect may depend Emotion cycles – Page 37 
on the intended effects on others' ego: A smile of a supportive manager may bolster the 
other person's ego, while the smile of a mocking auditor may do the opposite, serving to 
weaken and perhaps break a suspect of accounting crime (see also Rafaeli and Sutton, 
1991).  
2. Individual differences and emergent emotion cycles. 
Personalities of the individuals involved may determine whether or which emotion 
cycles develop. Hatfield et al. (1994) suggested that individual differences determine the 
extent to which emotion contagion occurs, but little research has been conducted in this 
direction. One notable exception is Van Kleef et al's. (2006) report that dispositional trust is 
a precursor to emotional responding. A particularly interesting individual difference 
variable is emotional intelligence (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1997), which suggests that 
people differ in their abilities to decode, understand, and regulate emotions. Cote and 
Miner's (2006) research suggests emotional intelligence to be particularly influential at low 
levels of cognitive intelligence. Because high cognitive intelligence usually contributes 
positively to work performance, people low in cognitive intelligence may profit the most 
from emotional intelligence; EI may be able to compensate for low cognitive intelligence in 
contributing to higher work performance (Cote and Miners, 2006). It may also be that 
different types of emotion cycles emerge with people low rather than high in cognitive 
intelligence (see also Bachman, Stein, Campbell & Sitarenios, 2000; Eisenberg, Fabes, 
Guthrie & Reiser, 2000; George, 2000; Jordan, Ashkenazy & Hartel, 2002). For example, it 
is possible that more convergence of emotions occurs in interactions among people low in 
cognitive intelligence but high on emotional intelligence than in interactions of people high 
in cognitive intelligence.   
Another individual difference that may shape emotion cycles is positive and 
negative affectivity of the individuals involved (cf. Brief & Weiss, 2002; Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985). Individuals high in positive affectivity are characterized by high energy, Emotion cycles – Page 38 
enthusiasm and pleasurable engagement, whereas those high in negative affectivity are 
characterized by distress, poor engagement and nervousness. Individuals high in positive 
affectivity are more optimistic and tend to focus on positive aspects of their social 
surroundings (Watson, 2000), whereas people high in negative affectivity are distressed, 
anxious and dissatisfied and tend to focus on negative aspects of their lives and social 
surroundings (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989). Accordingly, people high in positive affectivity 
can be expected to be more responsive to, and to react with their own positive emotions in 
response to others' positive emotions. In contrast, people high in negative affectivity are 
likely to pick up on others' negative emotions and to respond by themselves experiencing 
negative emotions.    
3. Effects beyond the dyad. 
Our analysis focused on the dyadic influence of an agent's emotion, occasionally 
calling upon and spilling over into a discussion of effects on group dynamics. However, our 
theory suggests that the effects of mimicking, emotion interpretation and drawing 
inferences may extend to an influence over group dynamics and, potentially, organizations 
as a whole, as multiple emotion cycles create a collective emotion. In other words, our 
theory may open the door to a conceptual understanding of the link between affect at 
different levels of analysis. The dynamics we describe – mimicking, emotion interpretation, 
etc., are interpersonal, but may be the foundations of the evolution of an "affective climate" 
in groups or organizations.  
As developed by Walter and Bruch (2007), positive affect in a group is likely a 
spiral that begins with one or two people displaying positive emotions. Individuals are 
likely involved in multiple emotion cycles that add up to a collective emotion. Concepts 
such as "affective climate" (as suggested by De Rivera, 1992) and "emotional climate" (as 
discussed by Gordon, 1989) somehow stem from individual emotion but also influence how 
people respond emotionally to one another – or, to use our terminology, how emotion Emotion cycles – Page 39 
cycles unfold. Organization-level emotion dynamics, as described by Gordon, (1989), Huy 
(2005) or Liu and Perrewe (2005), may well be traced to the emotion cycles involving 
individual agents.  
For example, when agents are boundary spanners, or representatives of an 
organization, as is often the case with customer-service agents, agent emotions may 
influence responses and behaviors toward the entity the agent represents. The affect of 
customer-service workers was argued in research on emotional labor to relate to customers’ 
evaluations of overall service quality (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; see also Doucet, 2004, 
and Pugh, 2001). The transfer from individual to organization-level dynamics likewise 
suggests that emotion cycles of one dyad may have spill-over effects on other people or 
dyads (Felps et al., 2006). In the case with which we opened this chapter, for example, both 
the department head and other faculty members may relate differently to their colleagues, to 
the department, or to the university following the emotion cycle we described. Such cycles 
may have implications for organizational structure: "Compassion Organizing" as described 
by Dutton, Worline, Frost and Lilius (2006), for example, refers to an organization-level 
construct that may spring off individual emotion cycles. 
 4. The iterative and emergent nature of emotion cycles. 
A serious limitation of prevailing research on emotion in organizations is the one-
shot uni-directional perspective typically maintained. Research typically considers affective 
responses to various stimuli, be they intra-person (e.g., "People get angry because their 
goals are obstructed) or inter-personal (e.g., "People get angry when others get in their 
way"). But social and organizational interactions are rarely one-shot unidirectional 
interactions, and typically involve multiple iterations, meaning that emotion episodes 
constantly surface (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; De Dreu, 2001) and emotion cycles 
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A complete understanding of the idea of emotion cycles requires in-depth 
examination of the dynamics embedded in our analysis, as well as dynamics we could not 
cover here for lack of space. For example, when does mimicking lead to further mimicking 
and when does it lead to emotion interpretation and reaction? Under what conditions do 
meanings inferred from emotion provoke approach behaviors and when do they provoke 
avoidance? These are puzzles our analysis leaves open because relevant research is not 
available. Research on emotion cycles is complicated by the need both to monitor initiating 
actions and to follow up on a possible wide range of reactions of both other people and the 
initiating agent. It may be that new research paradigms and approaches need to be 
developed to fully unravel the complexity we have merely sketched. A discussion of such 
paradigms is beyond the scope of this chapter, but some ideas can be found in Smith and 
Conrey's (2007) discussion on agent-based modeling.     
5. Why do emotions influence others? 
Finally, a fascinating question that overshadows our analysis is why. What is it 
about emotion that drives its influence over others and leads others to react as they do? One 
explanation offered by our analysis is that emotions embed information that may be 
influential over other people. Extracting information from emotions requires relatively little 
effort (Calder et al., 1996), and may be automatic which is probably lucky, as people are 
known to be cognitive misers (Taylor, 1981).  
A second possibility has to do with the relationship between emotion and mental 
resources (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). Building on the idea that emotional experiences can 
be depleting (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998; Beal, Weiss, Barros & 
MacDermid, 2005; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), Rafaeli et al. (2006c) showed that others' 
anger can deplete people of mental resources required for performing work and other 
cognitive tasks. Customer service clerks were exhausted and displayed poorer cognitive 
performance after participating in angry social interactions. The emotion cycle idea Emotion cycles – Page 41 
suggests that in response to an emotionally exhausted employee who does not think or work 
well, customers become even angrier, which escalates the employee's exhaustion, and may 
influence emotions and behavior of future customers. Emotion cycles, therefore, include 
different people at different stages, raising a question of when does a particular emotion 
cycle begin or end One customer's anger that exhausts the service agent can affect the way 
another "innocent" customer is treated, and the reactions of this (initially uninvolved) 
victim may come back to influence the employee: Is this one emotion cycle or two?     
A complementary process is the sense of being energized experienced by people in 
the presence of agents who exude excitement, which may lead to improved performance 
and a positive emotion cycle. Emotion cycles may therefore be mediated by reciprocal 
cycles between emotion and attention or emotion and cognition (Fenske & Raymond, 
2006), which suggests that interpersonal emotion cycles may occur because of the influence 
of interpersonal affect on the performance of other cognitive tasks that are important to 
participants in interpersonal interactions.  
At a more philosophical level, the answer to the question "why" may be that 
emotion cycles are one of the foundations of social communities. Emotions, and especially 
the ability to communicate them in a variety of ways, are qualities that separate man from 
beast, and are argued to hold evolutionary importance (Spoor & Kelley, 2004; Turner, 
2000). By attending and responding to each other's emotions – being sympathetic when 
someone is sad, apologetic when someone is hurt, or angry when someone is offensive – 
people may be constructing and maintaining the social communities on which mankind is 
dependent.    Emotion cycles – Page 42 
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Figure 1  
Reciprocity between Agents and Others in Reactions to Emotion  
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Figure 2  
Emotion Mimicking
6  
 
 
 
                                                  
6  For the sake of clarity the figure depicts dyadic effects. There are possible effects on more than one person 
and this will be depicted later. This is the case also for the two following figures.  
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Figure 3  
Emotion Interpretation   
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Figure 4  
Inferences from Emotion and their Effects on Behavior  
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Figure 5  
Multiple Person Emotion Cycle 
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